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Lifting Printz Off Dual Sovereignty:
Back to a Functional Test for the Etiquette of Federalism
Alfred R. Ligh(

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the Supreme Court revived constitutional federalism in National League of Cities. 1 In 1985, the Court overruled that decision. 2 In
the 1990s, however, the United States Supreme Court once again resurrected constitutional federalism, but this time, however, in a different
form- the "etiquette of federalism."' In New York v. United States, the
Court held that the federal government lacked authority to "compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." 4 In Printz v.
United States, the Court went further to hold that "Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly." 1
Ruling that "the Framers rejected the concept of a central government
that would act upon and through the States," 6 the Court found unconstitutional provisions of the Brady Act requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. 7
Where the national government issues a command directing a state
official to enact or implement a certain policy, the command is ineffective because it is unconstitutional. In Printz, the Court concluded that its
determinations as to whether such a command offends state sovereignty is
not subject to any sort of balancing test. 8 The etiquette of federalism is

* Copyright <D 1'198 by Alfred R. Light. Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School
of Law, Miami, Florida. J.D. Harvard University; Ph.D. University of North Carolina; B.A. The
Johns Hopkins University.
I Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 ( 1976)
2. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth, 469 U.S. 528 ( 1985).
3. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J, concurring).
4. 505 US. 144, 188 (1992)
5 117 S Ct. 2365, 2384 ( 1997) [hereinafter Printz].
6. 117 S. Ct. at 2377.
7 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. I 03-159. I 07 Stat. I '136 ( 1'!'!6)
S The Court held:
[t]he whole ob;ed of the law to direct the functioning of the state
executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual
sovereignty, such a 'balancing' analysis is inappropriate. It is the very
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no

49

50

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 13

violated even though the command is formally directed to a state official
rather than a state and whatever the reasons the state official may have
not to follow the command. 9 It is violated even though the command
merely directs the performance of enforcement or ministerial obligations
as opposed to policy. 10 Because of its categorical nature, the Printz
Court's doctrine of dual sovereignty has arbitrary parameters. 11 This nature contrasts sharply with other doctrinal areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence involving federal-state relations.
Decided in the summer of 1997, Printz spurred extensive commentary, both in anticipation of and in reaction to the Supreme Court decision. Derided as "antinationalist" 12 and "anti-federalist," 11 some observers
even detected a retum to the antebellum philosophy of John C. Calhoun. 1 ~
There have been attacks on the Court's methodology, its "doctrinal formalism,"1' as well as its policy objectives. 16 Even those who defend the

comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that
fundamental defect.
Prin1:. 117 S. Ct. at 23S3.
'J Prrnlz.. 117 S Ct. a! 2182 (maJority), 2399 (dissent).
I 0. Sec in/1-o notes n-~2 and accompanying text.
II
Profe"or Chemerinsky recently termed the Supreme Court's approach in th" area as
"formalistic" 1n contrast to "functional." Erwin Chemcrinsky, Formalism and Funi"lronalrsm 111
Federalism i\r11rlvsis. IJ GA. ST U L REV. 95') ( l'l'J7). Though Professor Chemerinsky 111 my view
does not provide sufficient countenance to the Supreme Court policies which underlie its "an!J·
conscription" doctrine, essentially we complain about the same phenomenon. He complains that
the Supreme Court has no "justification as to the constitutional hasis" for its new 1Cderalisn1
policies. The prohlern is that the Court uses its policies to justify its constJtutJOnal theory while
failing to assess the policies in the context of the particular statute it is evaluating. See !llso Erwin
Chcmennsky. The Values of Federalism, 47 U. FIA L REV. 499 ( 1995). The Harvard Law Review
s11ndarly complains of Pwr!~'s "bright-line rule, the parameters of which remain unspecified."
Note. Federalism · Com{'elling S/({/e Ofjinals to Fnjiiln' Federal Regulmon· Reg11ncs. Ill H,\RV.
L REV 207 (I'J'J7)
12 Evan H. Camicker, f'rinl.", Slir!<' Sovertignn·. and tire IAmi/.1 of Fonwrlrsnr. 19')7 Sl P
Ci R1:v 19'). 200, 248 (19'J7J
1.1. John E. Nowak, Federaliw1 and lire Civrl War i\nrendmen/.1. 23 01110 N.U L RlcV
1209. 1235 (1997)
14. Bernard Schwartz, A Presidenlial Strikeout, Federalism. RFR;\, S!ond11rg. and S!tal!h
Courl, :n Tt'LSA L J. 77, 81 (1997); cj: Nowak, supra note 13, at 1235.
15. Camicker. supra note 12, at 20 I
ln. E.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Poliliml Economy of Coopemlil'e Ferlerali.\rll Win·
S!tl/e Au!onomv Makes Sense and "Dual Sm·ereigntv" !Joesn'l, 9() Mllll. L REV. 81.1 (I'J98)
(Supreme Court needs to develop a principled intergovernmental relations and political economy
rationale for its results in cases such as Prinlz. because the justifications for the national!stic dual
federalism doctrine developed by the Marshall and Taney courts no longer exisl); Nell Kmkopf.
Of /)n·olulion, Pril·itimlion, and Gloholwrtion: Sepormion of f'owers Limils on Congre.,·srontrl
i\u!irorilr lo ;\ssign Federal l'm1er lo Non-Federal i\ctors, 'iO RUTCiLRS L. REv :n I I 1998)
(Court's separation of powers doctrines do not supp011 Prinlz dictum establishing a flat prohibition
on congressiOnal transfer of executive authority to a State); Evan H. Camicker, supra note 12. at
247 ("But because Justice Scalia's opinion eschews explicit discussion of the nonnative values
undcrlyi,1g various definitions of state sovereignty, he provides no clear guidance concermng why
or how Important he believes it is to protect state autonomy.").
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Court's holding rationalize the result with reference to constitutional doctrine or theory other than ones used by the Court. 17 Other commentary
traces Printz's implications for specific regulatory areas. 1s
Ironically, however, most commentary has not focused on Printz's
novelty within the specific context of other constitutional doctrines addressing federal-state relations. 19 This article focuses precisely on how
Printz stands out when compared to related federal-state doctrines articulated by the Court. Part II opens this discussion by contrasting Printz's
categorical test with balancing approaches used with respect to (I) Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, (2) Erie-related doctrines regarding the application of federal law in state courts, (3) procedural due
process applied to state governmental decisions, and (4) separation of
powers jurisprudence. Part III briefly explores the historical underpinnings and functional justifications for Printz's "anti-conscription" doctrine. Finally, this article concludes that a balancing approach, akin to the
parsing of national and state functions under earlier dual sovereignty doctrines, is more likely to detect situations which offend the core policies
the Court is trying to protect (i.e. political accountability, preservation of
liberty, cost internalization, and separation of powers) than the technical
boundaries upon which the current Printz test turns.
II.

PRINTZ'S NOVELTY

The parameters of the Supreme Court's newest doctrine of constitutional federalism depart from those which the Court has developed in related areas of federal-state relations, such as Eleventh Amendment immunity, state court jurisdiction, procedural due process, and separation of
powers cases. Printz prohibits injunction actions against state officials,
though the Court's 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida 20 preserved such actions in the context of Eleventh Amendment
immunity .21 Printz categorically refuses to compel state bureaucrats to

17. See Hills. supra note 16, at 939 (seeking to justify the result in Prinrz with reference
to the JUrisprudence of takings and free speech under the First and Fifth Amendments).
18. Alfred R. Light, He Who Pavs the Piper Should Cull r!ze Tune. Dual Sm-ereignrv in
U.S Envmmmental Law, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 779 (1998) (questioning the validity of provisions in
federal environmental statutes): Jay T. Jorgensen, The Pracrical Power of Srore and Low/
Govemments to Enfi1rce Fedemllmmixration Laws, 1997 BYU L. REV. 899, 925 (1997) (Attorney
General could not, with the approval of a state agency head, simply override a lack of authority
(or an express prohibition) in state law that limits the immigration enforcement functions that state
and local officials may undertake).
19. A notable exception in the separation of power area is Professor Neil Kinpopf, who has
examined Prinrz's sharp contrast with the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence under the
Appointments Clause. Kinpopf, supra note 16.
20. 517 U S 44 ( 1996) [hereinafter Seminole].
21. See infi'o notes 26-36 and accompanying text.

52

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 13

follow federally-mandated administrative procedures, though the Court,
only two weeks before Printz was decided, had limited its refusal to compel state courts to follow federal judicial procedure to situations where
state procedures are based on neutral principlesY Printz refuses to command state compliance with federal statutory procedures where federal
law controls the regulated citizens' rights and obligations, though the
Court has long commanded state compliance with procedures required by
constitutional due process, even for state administrative processes in
which the regulated citizens' rights and obligations are governed by state
law. 23 In addition, Printz enlists dual sovereignty to prohibit congressional transfer of the President's executive power to the States. 24 In separation of powers cases, however, the Court has sustained delegations of
power to the other branches of the federal Government where there are
adequate safeguards to cabin the delegated power and where encroachment on Presidential prerogatives are not too severe. In contrast, Printz
resolves its separation of powers concern through a categorical prohibition to foster a unitary Executive which clearly does not exist within the
Federal establishment. 25

A.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Printz Court found no constitutional significance in the fact that
the statute at issue attempted to impose responsibility on state officials
rather than the state itself, despite the principal dissent's adherence to
Eleventh Amendment distinctions between states and state officials embodied in Ex parte Young?" In Seminole, 27 decided the year prior to
Printz, the Court had decided that Congress lacks authority to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States through exercise of its
Commerce Power. The Court indicated there, however, that citizens
could continue under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young to seek prospective
injunctive relief from state officials violating federal law. 28

22. Johnson v. Fankell. 117 S. Ct. 1800. 1807 (1997): see infra notes 37-59 and
accompanying text; Evan H. Camicker, State Sovereixnty and Subordinacr: Mav Con;;ress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law:' 95 COLUM. L. REV. I 00 I, I 023 n.SH
(1995) ("For such procedural requirements to be valid, they must be nondiscriminatory with respect
to the source of the defense (both by their terms and as applied) and must be supported by a
legitimate and sufficiently strong state interest."); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of
Federal Rixhts, 99 HARV. L REV. 1128 ( 1986).
23. See infra notes 60-67 ;md accompanying text.
24. 117 S. Ct. 2365, at 2367; see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
25. See mf'ra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
26. 117 S. Ct. at 2382 (rnajonty), 2399 (dissent).
27. 517 U.S 44 (1996)
28. 517 U.S. at 71 n.14, 72 n.l6. Since the statute provided for remedies against a state
official less than the full remedial powers of the federal court, including contempt, which Ex Parte
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In the principal dissent in Printz, Justice Stevens notes the "considerable tension" between the majority's holding and the Court's "Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity cases." 29 Stevens indicates that a constitutional distinction between States, entitled to sovereign immunity, and
local officials (such as the officials instructed to implement the Brady
regime), not entitled to sovereign immunity under Eleventh Amendment
principles, should apply. 30 Again, however, the Court's majority rejected
the dissent's invitation to import such a distinction into its "anti-conscription" analysis, finding the "Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence" of "no
relevance." 31
The ex parte Young "fiction" is a long-established principle intended
to prevent states from subverting the Supremacy Clause through immunity from judicial orders to comply with federal law. 32 Commentators
note its "evident necessity ." 33 Printz's refusal to honor its distinctions,
between the state and a state's official and between retroactive sanctions
and prospective injunctive relief, undermines the Ex parte Young doctrine
by providing an additional and separate means for acquiescing in state
departures from statutory or constitutional mandates.
The Ex parte
Young doctrine has internal limits. The doctrine does not permit the recovery of money from a state even where a state official rather than the

Young would authorize, the Court read the statute to preclude an Ex Parte Young action against
a state official. 517 U.S at 74. ("[W]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for
the enforcement against a state of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting
aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte
Young"). In a somewhat similar context, the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1983 not to support
actions against state officials on the grounds that a suit against a state official is tantamount to a
suit agamst the official's office. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71
( 1989 ). Again in an important footnote, the Court distinguished suits seeking prospective relief
because "a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be
a person under § 1983 because personal-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the State." 491 U.S at 71 n.IO (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167
n.14 ( 1985)). Some have suggested that this hyper-technical distinction in 1988 signaled the
Court's paving the way for undermining the Ex Parte Young "fiction." Vicki C. Jackson, One
Hundred Years of' Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L REV. 51,
99 ( 1990) While this author finds this prospect remote, Jackson finds it more plausible that the
Court might extend Eleventh Amendment protection to actions against state officials for structural
relief to the extent those actions cannot, in the Court's view, be assimilated to common law writs
against individual officials. /d. at 104 n.l97. It is possible that Printz does this by adding to a
State's Eleventh Amendment immunity a State official's implied immunity to compel prospective
inJunctive relief under federal law in situations where the actions sought are acts of the State
official in his official rather than personal capacity.
29. 117 S. Ct. at 2394 n.l6.
30. 117 S. Ct. at 2399.
31. 117 S Ct. at 2382 n.l5.
32. See John E. Nowak, The Scope of' Conxressional Power to Create Causes of' Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLliM. L REV. 1413, 1445-46, 1455-58 (1975).
33. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-27 at 191 (2d ed. 1988)

54

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 13

state itself is the named party. 34 The exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity also does not apply to retroactive, as opposed to prospective,
relief in which a plaintiff seeks relief with respect to a state or state official's past behavior, such as damages, compensation, or an injunction
directed at undoing a completed transaction. The Court recently acknowledged that the doctrine "is an exercise in line-drawing" that must "reflect
the real interests of States" based on a case-by-case inquiry into a state's
"special sovereignty interests." 35 Printz undermines these distinctions by
establishing a separate constitutional federalism doctrine which ignores
the state vs. state official and retroactive/prospective distinctions and
which refuses to engage in a case-by-case balancing in deciding whether
to require state participation in a congressional regulatory scheme. 1"

B.

Erie and Related Doctrines

Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is not the only related area of
Supreme Court jurisprudence which the Printz court has ignored and may
undermine. The issue of the extent to which the Government can require
the States to follow specific procedures in support of federal statutory
objectives is reminiscent of long-standing problems associated with application of the Erie doctrine. Erie requires federal courts to apply state
law in adjudicating common law causes of action heard under the federal
courts' diversity jurisdiction. 37 In Hanna v. Plumer, 3x the Supreme Court
found that federal courts did not have to apply state judicial procedures in
diversity cases even though state substantive law must apply under the
Erie doctrine. Instead, the federal courts could follow the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The obverse of Hanna is the issue of whether a state
court adjudicating a federal cause of action may follow its own procedures when they differ from those which a federal court would follow had
the claim been brought there. 39 In Felder v. Casey, 40 the Court required
state courts to follow federal procedure in adjudicating federal claims
under Section 1983. In her dissent in Felder, Justice O'Connor com-

34. Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651. 663 (1974).
35. Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe. 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2039-40 ( 1997).
36. For example, the doctrine may complicate the use of citizen enforcement stuts m
environmental law. See Light, supra note 18, at 817-23.
37. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938).
38. 380 U.S 460 ( 1965).
39. For example, in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S 131 (1988), a Wisconsin court attempted to
apply a state statute which required notification of a state or local governmental entity or officer
within 120 days of the injury to a civil rights claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S C. ~ 1983 ( 1997 J
The Court held that the state notice provision was "patently incompatible with the compensatory
goals of the federal legislation" and refused to permit the state to use its procedures in adjudicating
the federal claim. !d. at 143.
40. 487 us. 131 (1988)
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plained that the Court had refused to allow state courts to follow their
own procedures because of "a sort of upside-down theory of federalism"
or a "'reverse-Erie' theory ." 41 State substantive law may not trump federal procedures under Hanna, but federal substantive law might trump
state procedure under Felder. 42
Concurrent with the Printz case in 1997, however, the Court reached
a result in favor of state procedural primacy in a suit adjudicating federal
statutory rights. In Johnson v. Fankell, 43 an Idaho trial court denied summary judgment on several officials' qualified immunity defense under
Section 1983. The officials appealed, but the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed. The United States Supreme Court held that even though the officials would have had a right to immediate appeal had their action been
brought in federal court, the state courts did not have to provide a similar
right within their state court systems. Quoting dictum from its earlier case
of H(ndett v. Rose 44 at length, Justice Stevens writing for a unanimous
Court emphasized the Court's reluctance to obligate a state court to entertain a federal claim "when [the] state court refuses jurisdiction because of
a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts." 4 ' In
Fankell. the Court distinguished Felder on the grounds that in Fankell
application of the state rule of procedure would not necessarily "produce
a final result different from what a federal ruling would produce," and
that the right of appeal under federal law did not have as its source the
substantive federal law provision Section 1983 but rather the procedural
federal law provision Section 1291. 46

-1 I 487 U S at 161 (O'Connor. J . dissenting).
-12 For example. qatc courts must forego their generally applicahk noticc~of~actlon
reqlllremcnts and awards of pre~judgment interest in the context of state court adjudicat1on of
federal statutory rights. Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan. 48(> U.S ..no (!'!881.
4.3
117 S. Ct. 1800 (1'!97).
-1-1 4% US ]56 (llJlJO).
-1'i. Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800. IXO'i ( 19'!7) (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U S
3)6, .\72 ( 1990))
46. 117 S. Ct. at 1806. In the course of its analysis, the Court found relevant its rat10nale
in a somewhat different Sect10n 198] case, Johnson v. Jones, 505 U.S. 304 ( 1995). In that case,
the Court considered claims of government officials that they were entitled to an immediate appeal
from an order denying them summary judgment on the ground that the record showed a genuine
issue of matetial fact whether the off1cials had enlia!ied in conduct that constituted a ckar violation
of constitutional law. The Court in Johnson upheld the order. distinguishing its em·Jier case of
idllche/1 ,. Forsrth, 472 U.S. 511 ( 19X5). in which the Court endorsed an immediate appeal on
the issue of whether the facts shm1·ed a l'io!ation of clearly established law. The Court explained
that in Johnson the court had found the "strong 'countervailing considerations' surrounding
appropriate interpretation of ~ 129 I" to be "of sufficient importance to outweigh the officials·
interest in avoiding the burdens of litigation." Johnson v. Fankcll, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1807 (1'!97).
Similarly, in Johnson 1·. Fanke/1, the Court found strong "countervailing considerations" in the
need to respect a State courts' "conSistent application of its neutral procedural rules" to a federal
hm requinng "a State to undertake something as fundamental as restructuring the operation of its
courts." /d.

56

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 13

The balancing approach elaborated in Fankell acknowledges a sort of
"Converse-Hanna" doctrine for state judges. The doctrine looks to factors
like those which have guided the Erie doctrine over the years, such as the
relation of procedure and substance, outcome determination, and the balancing of state and federal interests. 47 Its analytical balancing approach,
like the Ex parte Young doctrine, thus contrasts with Printz's categorical
"anti-conscription" principle for state law enforcement officials.
In Printz, the Government found relevance in principles requiring
state courts to hear claims under federal law, citing the landmark decision
of Testa v. Katt. 48 Testa requires state courts to adjudicate claims arising
under federal law where the state courts have adequate jurisdiction over
similar claims under state and locallaw. 49 Like Fankell, Testa embodies a
nondiscrimination principle. States may deny a forum to hear federal
claims only where they decline to hear analogous state law claims. 50 But
the Court rejected the Government's argument and distinguished the case,
explaining, "Testa stands for the proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law - a conclusion mandated by the terms of the
Supremacy Clause." 51
The Printz Court found Testa not relevant because of (I) the text of
the Constitution binding "the Judges in every State" to federal law in a
context where lower federal courts might not even be established, 52 (2)
the distinctive nature of courts where "unlike legislatures and executives,
they applied the law of other sovereigns all the time," 53 and (3) the distinctiveness of recent cases allowing Congress to require "state administrative agencies to apply federal law while acting in a judicial capacity." 5 ~
The Court concluded that cases discussing state court obligations were
irrelevant because it viewed the obligations of state administrators under
Brady to be "non adjudicative responsibilities of the state agency." 55 Re

47. Cf Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 ( 1945) (outcome determinative test under
Erie); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 ( 195X) (balancing test
under Erie); Dice v. Akron, Canton, & Youngstown R.R., 342 US 359 ( 1952) (balancing of state
federal interests to decide right to trial by jury in state court under federal cause of actton)
48. 117 S. Ct. at 2381 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 3S6 ( 1947)).
49. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 773 n.4 (I n2) (Powell. J , concurnng and
dissenting).
50. /d., citing Note, Utilization of' State Courts to Enfi~rce Federal Penal and Cnnunal
Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 HARV. L. REV. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Tcsw
upsets "the traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's sovereign right to
determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its own courts"). /d.
51. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381
52. 117 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl 2)
53. !d.
54. 117 S. Ct. at 2381 (interpreting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-771 & n.24
(1982))
55. 117 S. Ct. at 2382 n.l4. Justice Stevens, the author of the unanimous opmion in
Fanke/1, wrote the principal dissent in Printz. As one might expect, Stevens dispatches the
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jection of congressional requirements that States comply tn an administrative context was categorical. ' 6
Despite the debate in Printz over Testa, neither the Court nor Justice
Steven's dissent makes reference to Fankell decided two weeks earlier.
Instead of resting his Printz dissent on the grounds that the state's refusal
to implement the Brady Act was not based on "neutral procedural rules,"
Justice Stevens endorses less cabined congressional discretion to appraise
"the interests of cooperative federalism" and "its own constitutional
power" and to decide whether to enlist the States in lieu of "an enlarged
federal bureaucracy." 57 Both the majority and Justice Stevens adopt
bright-line rules. The majority holds that Congress cannot compel the
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program by conscripting
state officers directly. 5x Stevens would defer to Congress as to such matters.)'' Erie-like cases suggest a more even-handed approach in which the

majority"s categorical distinction of judicial and other capacities in which state administrators act.
117 S Ct. at 2400-2401 (Stevens. J. dissenting). Stevens sees the majority's reliance on the text
of the Supremacy Clause as "misguided" because the Clause is not the source of the state judge's
"duty to accept jurisdiction of federal claims that they would prefer to ignore." 117 S Ct. at 2400.
Instead, the Clause is direct to the matter of what law applies in cases properly before a state
court. Moreover, he rejects the majmity's implicit eXJJressio unius argument that the Constitution's
endorsement of requiring state judges to enforce federal law implies no similar obligation for other
state officials. !d.
56. In rejecting the Government's arguments that the Court should examine the burdcm and
benefits of requiring state implementation, the Court explains:
Assuming all the mentioned factors were true, they might he relevant if Wt: were
evaluating whether the Incidental application to the States of a federal law of general
applicability excessively interfered with the functioning of state governments
But
where, as here, it 1s the whole ohject of the law to direct the functioning of the slat<:
executive, and henct: to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty, such
a 'balancing' analysis in inapproptiatc. It is the very Jirinciple of separate slate sovt:rcignty
that such a law offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can
overcome that fundamental defect.
117 S.Ct. at 2383.
57. 117 S. Ct. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
59. That Stevens disagrees with the general notion that Congress cannot force States to
implement federal regulations is apparent throughout his dissent. 117 S. Ct. at 2390 ("[S]tale
judiCial and executive branch ofllcials may he required to implement federal law where the
National Government acts within the scope of its afllnnativc powers."); 117 S. Ct. :11 2.195
("[ U]nelected JUdges are better off leaving the protection of federalism to the political process in
all but the most extraordinary circurmtances"); 117 S. Ct. at 2398 ("The majority relics upon
dictum in New York to the effect that '[t]he Federal Government may not compel States to enact
or administer a federal regulatory program.' But that language was wholly unnecessary to the
decision of the case."). Other than a backhand salute to a princtple he traces to Notionol Leuxue
of C11ies that there may he a constituiJOnally-signiticant distinction between a command to "States
as States" to enact legislation and a command to state ofllcials to assist the Federal government,
Stevens disclanns a JUdicial role in regulating congrt:ssional cnlistmc:nl of the States. 117 S Ct
at 239X.
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Court would balance substantive federal policies against state administrative burdens in order to resolve the matter on a case-by-case basis.
C.

Procedural Due Process

Printz's rejection of a balancing approach also implicates the Court's
principles of procedural due process. The procedural due process explosion of the 1970's arose in the context of individuals seeking entitlements
from the federal largess, in landmark cases such as Goldberg v. Keflv 00
and Mathews v. Eldridge. 61 In this area of constitutional law, the Court
also balances interests of affected citizens and the Government to determine how much process is due in administrative decisions. 62
In procedural due process jurisprudence, the choice as to whether a
state creates an "entitlement" or other constitutionally-protected interest
belongs to the state. Federal due process protections under the Fourteenth
Amendment critically depend upon the state's view of its own law.(d But
once rights and obligations under state law are established, the state's
administrative and judicial processes must meet federal constitutional
requirements. 64 For example, a state may choose to operate or not to operate prisons. If they choose to operate prisons, however, they must meet
constitutional-required minimum standards. 61
In Printz, the Court refused to require a state or its officials to support
the federal interest in gun registration in the context of the state's law
enforcement regime. It refused despite the expression of that federal interest in a federal statute validly enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. As Justice Stevens' dissent points out, Printz eliminates the Hobson's Choice logic of PERC v. Mississippi under which a state must regu-

~97 u s 254 ( 1970)
424 US. 31'! (1976)
These principles apply in the context of a regulatory regime. For example. Ill Hrod 1
Rai!ll'a\" E.tpre.Is. Inc.. 481 U.S. 252 (I <J87). a federal agency adnunistcrcd a regime regulating
commercial motor transportation. including protection of employees of companies who refuse to
operate a motor vehicle that docs not comply with applicable qatc and federal safety regulations
The Court found that the failure of the federal agency's administrative process to inform the
employer of the relevant evidence before temporary reinstatement of an employee deprived the
employer of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment.
63. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudcnnill. 470 U.S. 532. 53X-3<J ( l'!X5) (property
intcre,tl. cert. denied after remand. 4XX US. 946 (I <JH8); Hewitt v. Helm'. 45<J US 460. 466-6 7
(ln3) (liberty interest); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co .. 455 US 422. 431-33 (19X2); Paul v
Davis. 424 U.S. 693. 708-09 (I <J76); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564. 576-77 (I '!72)
64. This is the central message of Loudnmil/"s rejection of Justice Rehnquist's "bitter wilh
the sweet" approach. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudennill. 470 U S. 532, 541 (I <J85) ( .. The point
is straight forward: the Due Process Clause provides that ccr1ain substantive nghts-lifc. liberty,
and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The
catcgones of substance and procedure arc distinct.").
65. See Welsh v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122. 1132 n.R (8th Cir 1977)

60.
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62.
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late under federal standards or choose not to continue to regulate at all. 66
Printz contrasts sharply with the procedural due process cases. Due Process requires that a state conform its regulatory processes to Federal minimum procedural requirements mandated by the courts, notwithstanding
the state's control over creation or elimination of the "property" subjected to the procedural requirements. Printz, however, simply permits a
state to refuse to participate in Federal regulatory processes mandated by
the Congress, notwithstanding the state's ongoing institutions operating
pursuant to state procedure in an overlapping area logically related to the
Federal substantive regulation. 67 Without sanction, the States may do
nothing.

o6. I 17 S Ct. at 23'!'! ("In FERC, we upheld a federal statute requiring state utilities
commissions, inter alia, to take the affirmative step of considering federal energy standards in a
manner complying with federally specified notice and comment procedures, and to report back to
Congre" periodically." The Court continued, "the state commissions could avotd this obligation
only by ceasing regulation in the field, a 'choice' that we recognized was realisttcally foreclosed,
since Congress had put forward no altemative regulatory scheme to govern this very important
area."). The Printz Court's attempt to distinguish FERC is altogether unconvincing. Justice
Rehnquist writes that in FERC the Court had "upheld the statutory provisions at issue precisely
because they dtd not commandeer state government, but merely imposed preconditions to continued
state regulation of an otherwise pre-empted ticld." 117 S. Ct. at 23~ I The Court also makes
reference to Hodel \'. Virglllia Surji1ce Mining & Reclwnation Assn., Inc., 4.~2 li.S. 264 (I 'JX I),
hut unlike FFRC, the regulatory regime considered in Hodel placed "the full regulatory burden"
on the Federal Government m the event that a state chose not to cooperate in regulation. 452 U.S.
204, 2X~. No such alternative existed in FERC.
The d1"entmg opinions in FERC arc far more telling. Justice Powell argued in his partial
dissent in FERC that the statute involved there violated the Tenth Amendment to the extent that
it "prescribes administrative and judicial procedures that States must follow in deciding whether
to adopt the proposed standards." 456 U.S. at 771 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell found
FERC particularly offensive to state sovereignty in its provision for judicial review of state
decisions at the instance of the Federal Government or "any person" under the statute's citizen
cnf(Jrcemcnt suit provision. 456 U.S. at 772-73 (Powell, J., dissenting). He found Testa not to the
contrary because of Testo's recognition that "Congress must respect the state institution's own
decisionmaking structure and method." 451) U.S. at 773 n.4 (Powell. J .. dissenting). Instead, he
found 'li•sto\ general principal that the Congress must take the state courts as it finds them fully
applicable "to other organs of state government." 456 U.S. at 774. Justice O'Connor's dissenting
opimon in FERC, while more provocative and wide-ranging, is consistent with Justice Powell's.
456 U.S. at 783 (O'Connor, J., dissentmg) t"[T[here is nothing 'cooperative' about a federal
program that compels state agencies either to function as bureaucratic puppets of the Federal
Government or to abandon regulation of an entire field traditionally reserved to state authority.").
In Print:, the tnajority essentially adopts the FERC dissenters· views.
6 7. Under FFRC, a state had to abandon public utility regulation, a matter upon which the
Federal government had no intention of offering a federal alternative regulatory system, in order
to a\<lld doing the Congress' btdding on specific issues of federal interest. Under f'wll?, a state
need not abandon local law enforcement, a matter upon which the Federal government has no
intention of offering a federal altemative regulatory system, in order to avoid dotng the Congrc"'
bidding un specific Issues of federal Interest.
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Separation of Powers

The "anti-conscription" principle also implicates the Supreme
Court's balancing principles governing separation of powers and the delegation doctrine. Viewed through the anti-delegation or separation of powers lens, the Printz question may be recast as whether and to what extent
the President's executive power to implement or enforce federal law can
be conferred or transferred to the States. The majority's practical separation of powers concern is that conscription of the States encroaches upon
the prerogatives of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. The
congressional vesting of executive power in the States or their officials,
which are not subject to the direct supervisory control of the President.
presents the same sort of separation of powers concerns as creation of
agencies within the Federal Government not subject to Presidential direction or congressional structures that avoid the Constitution's assignment
of specific responsibilities to the Executive Branch. 6 x
In this respect, attempted congressional transfer of the President's
authority to implement, or "execute" to use the Article II term, resembles
other congressional attempts to avoid Presidential prerogatives to prepare
the budget, 69 to obtain confidential advice regarding appointments, 70 or to
veto legislation presented to him in the constitutionally prescribed manner.71 The "anti-conscription" principle thus serves the function ''to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President's exercise of the
'executive power' and his constitutionally appointed duty to 'take care
that the laws be faithfully executed' under Article II." 72 In this sense, the
Brady law resembles the unconstitutional Gramm-Rudman regime of
Bmt·sher v. Synar, where Congress attempted "to grant to an officer under
its control what it does not possess," the President's executive power. 73 It
is unlike the independent counsel approved in Morrison v. Olson because
the President may not remove the state and local law enforcement officials charged to administer the provisions of the Brady law. Justice Seal ia
insists in Printz that the Framers sought " unity in the Federal Executive- to insure both vigor and accountability." 74
He concludes: "That

68. A note in the Harvard L1w Review in the early e1ghties saw federal cklegat!on ol
administrative obligations to the States to "constitute an improper delegation of federal power llr
a violation of the due process of lawmaking." Note. Tenrh Amendmenl. 96 flAR\i L REV. I'! I n 12
( 1982)
69. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S 714 (1986).
70. Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 US 440. 467 ( 1'!89) (Kennedy.
J .. concurring).
71. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S 919 (1983)
72. Morrison v. Olson. 487 US. 654. 658 ( 1988).
73. Bowsher. 478 U.S. 714. 726 (1986)
74. 117 S Ct. at 237X
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unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject
to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as
with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its law." 75
Justice Scalia in Printz also complains, that in delegating enforcement authority to the States, Congress of necessity delegates discretion to
act or not to act. For example, a law enforcement official charged with
administration of the Brady law must interpret what "reasonable efforts"
must be made to conduct background checks and, as a consequence, decide what priority to give the congressionally mandated tasks with respect
to personnel and time vis a vis other responsibilities. 76 In explaining the
need for a categorical prohibition on congressional transfers of executive
power to the States, Printz questions distinctions made in the Government's brief between "making" law or "policymaking," and "enforcing"
law or "implementation." Scalia sees this line as similar to the distinction
of "proper congressional conferral of Executive power from unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority for separation-of-powers purposes."77 "Executive action that has utterly no policymaking component
is rare," he opines and concludes that "an imprecise barrier against federal intrusion ... upon state authority is not likely to be an effective
one."n In any event, he fails to see how permitting Congress to "dragoon" the States to "enforce" federal law because the Brady law "leaves
no 'policymaking' discretion with the States" or "improves rather than
worsens the intrusion upon state sovereignty." 79
Distinctions between policymaking and implementation or
enforcement, however, have long been a subject of Supreme Court concern in the interpretation of important federal statutes. For example, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Government may not be sued when

75. !d. Professor Camicker has criticized this aspect of Printz. Evan H. Camicker. The
Unitarv t'xecuttve and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075, JOn
( 1'!97 J ("[ A]s a practtcal matter. presidential supervision of state officials cannot realistically secure
the values of centralized authority that drive the unitary theory.").
76. I 17 S. Ct. at 23R I
77 !d.

n

M

79 /d. That Justice Rehnquist concurs in Justice Scalia's opinion questioning the practicality
of a workable anti-delegation doctrine amuses in light of his previous advocacy of resuiTecting such
a doctrine in earlier Supreme Court decisions. E.g., Industrial Union AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum lnst. 44R US. 607. 675 (19RO) (Rehnquist, J .. concurring) ("I have no doubt that the
proviston at issue, standing alone. would violate the doctrine against uncanalized delegations of
legislative power."). Scalia also touches on the Court's recent separation of powers cases elsewhere.
referring: to the Chadha legislative veto decision for the proposition that JUSt because recent
Congresses have enacted many similar provisions does not mean that they all cannot he
unconstitutional. 117 S. Ct. at 2376 ("The legislative veto, though enshrined in perhaps hundreds
of federal statutes, most of which were enacted in the 1970's and the earliest of which was enacted
in 1'!32. was nonetheless held unconstitutional.").
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its agents are performing discretionary functions_xo Non-discretionary or
ministerial functions inadequately performed, however, can be the subject
of damages action by those injured. Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, the Court has long distinguished two types of administrative discretion, agency action "committed to agency discretion by law" not subject
to judicial review at all because there is "no law to apply"xt and agency
action reviewable to determine whether it should be overturned as arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.x 2 In Printz, however, Justice
Scalia disclaims the practicality of determining whether state executive
action has a sufficiently minor policymaking component so as to constitute mere enforcement . The Court thus simply refuses, in the context of
its dual sovereignty doctrine, to make the same sort of distinctions it frequently has made elsewhere.

XO. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 US. 315 ( 199 I) (challenged action of federal
regulators involved the exercise of discretion in furtherance of public policy goals and thus chums
barred by the discretionary function exception); Berkowitz v. United States, 486 U.S 531 (I 988)
(suit based on Government's licensing of an oral polio vaccine and on its subsequent approval of
the release of a specific lot of that vaccine to the public not within discretionary function exception
if government policy did not allow official who took the challenged action to release a
noncomplying lot on the hasis of policy considerations); Dalehite v. United States, 346 US 15
( 1953) (claims arising from massive explosion of fertilizer manufactured and prepared for export
pursuant to federal program for increasing food supply in occupied areas after World War !I barred
by discretionary function exception).
81. Ex, Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S 182 ( 1993) (decisions about allocating funds from a
Jump sum appropriation); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 ( 1988) (employment termination dccJsJons
of the CIA director); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S 270, 282 ( I'JH7) (refusals to grant
reconsideration of an action because of material error); Heckler v. Chancy, 470 US. S21 1 Jl)85J
(decisions not to take enforcement action). The reviewability of the actions of an adrmnistrator turn
on the nature of the action and the existence of a congressional standard by which to evaluate the
action. In the absence of an express statutory standard, the decision of a prosecutor not to hnng
an act1on or of a bureaucrat not to allocate funds to a program may not he r..:viewablc. CongreS'
may. however. cabin the prosecutor's chscretion by specifying the criteria limiting his ability to
decline prosecutiOn or the bureaucrat's discretion by specifying precisely how agency rnon1es may
be spent. In the latter situation. agency actions or inactions may he overturned as "contrar; to
law"
R2. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 40 I U.S. 402 ( !l)7! ). Outside the context
of statutory construction, the Court also has needed to distinguish ministenal from discrclionar;
duties tclr the purpose of deciding whether an extraordinary writ of mandamus should issue. Th1s
distinction goes hack at least as far as Marbury v. Madison, where Wilham Marbury sought ro
compel Madison to deliver Marbury's commission as a justice of the peace. Chief Justice Marshall
drew a sharp distinction between ministerial obligations whose fulfillment mandamus could compel
and discretionary powers, with which the writ could not interfere. Mandamus sometimes seems to
function much l1ke "abuse of discretion" review under the APA. See Work v. Rives, 267 US. 175
(I 925). Other times a more orthodox view seems to prefer that mandamus lie only for breach of
a "clear, non-discretionary duty." Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984) But the Court always
has acknowledged that a line must be drawn.
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A FUNCTIONAL TEST FOR DUAL SOVEREIGNTY

Printz.' s rhetoric makes reference to a number of policy concerns
which motivate dual sovereignty, including political accountability,R 3
preservation of liberty,R 4 and internalization of costs.w; Though the Court
describes these functions in its discussion of the historical origins of the
dual sovereignty doctrine, its does not examine such concerns in its evaluation of the intergovernmental arrangement in Printz. Instead, the Court
merely looked to see whether the Federal Government has sought to compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Because it
did, the attempt failed. 86 The Court should not have abandoned the analytical methods it has used in other doctrinal areas in developing its etiquette of federalism.
Even if every schoolchild learns the doctrine of dual sovereignty ,x 7
that term no where appears in the Constitution's text, and its origins can
seem "mystical." 88 Much of the Court's discussion in Printz. is devoted to
an exploration of those origins. Printz's case for dual sovereignty rests
primarily on a historical analysis of the Framing Period and an examination of the structure of the Constitution. 89 This reliance probably is due in
no small measure to the Jack of persuasiveness in its subsequent argument
that "prior jurisprudence" of the Court commands its result. 90
The Government argued in Printz that the Framers and early
Congresses contemplated that the Federal Government would make use
of the States to administer federal programs. This was in response to the
Petitioner's claim that the practice was "until very recent years at least,
unprecedented." 91 What every schoolchild learns, according to the Court,
is that citizens within the United States are subject to the laws of two sov-

X3. Printz. 117 S. Ct. at 2377 ("The Constitution thus contemplates that a State's
government wtll represent and remain accountable to its own citizens.").
X4. 117 S. Ct. at 2378 ("[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.").
X5. 117 S. Ct. at 2382 ("By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of
implementing a federal regulatory program. Members of Congress can take credit for 'solvmg'
problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal
taxes."!.
X6. 117 S. Ct. at 2383.
87. See Gregory v. Ashcroft. 501 U.S 452. 457 (1991) (O'Connor, l).
88. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742. 767 n.30 (19X2) ("For while Justice O'Connor
articulates a view of state sovereignty that is almost mystical. she entirely fails to address our
central point.").
89. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369~2376 (discussion of the Framing Period); 117 S Ct. at 2376~
2379 (structure).
90. Thts portion of the Court's analysis is found at 117 S.Ct at 2379~2383. Justice Stevens
comments that "a neutral historian would have to conclude that the Court's discussion of history
does not even begin to establish a prima facie case." 117 S Ct. at 2394 n.l5.
91
117 S Ct. at 2370.
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ereigns, a national government of enumerated powers and a state government of a "residuary and inviolable sovereignty." 92 The "Framers rejected
the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the
States, and instead designed a system in which the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people-who
were, in Hamilton's words, 'the only proper objects of government.' ,q 1
In contrast to the Court's categorical test for detecting violations of
the etiquette of federalism, its "rationale" for the doctrine has a functional
basis. Dual sovereignty has two principal functions for state governments: to ensure that States "will represent and remain accountable to its
own citizens" 94 and to structure a protection of liberty to "reduce the risk
of tyranny." 95 The doctrine also serves to ensure the same two functions
for the Federal government and protects the unitary nature of Executive
power in the President. 96
As DeTocqueville later emphasized, it was the Framers' "master
stroke of policy" that "the Federal courts, acting in the name of the laws,
should take cognizance only of parties in an individual capacity." 97
DeTocqueville himself was shocked how the "plain American" citizen:
could distinguish with surprising facility the obligations created
by the laws of Congress from those created by the laws of his
own state, and who, after having discriminated between the matters which come under the cognizance of the Union and those
which the local legislature is competent to regulate, could not
point out the exact limit of the separate jurisdictions of the Federal courts and the tribunals of the state. 98
Late eighteenth century foreign observers of American government
expressed sentiments similar to those of DeTocqueville. Lord Bryce,

92. 117 S Ct. at 2376 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed .. 1961 )).
93. 117 S Ct. at 2377 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15. at I 09 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed .. 1961 )).
94. 117 S. Ct. at 2377. Accountability in this sense would include attribution of the costs
of government to the level responsible for setting policy.
95. 117 S Ct. at 2378 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft. 501 U.S. 452.458 (1991))
96. !d.
97. DETOCQUEYILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 154.
98. !d. at 173. DeTocqueville questioned whether such a system woulu work in other
cultures, such as those in Mexico and Europe. For America, though, DcTocqucville saw the
division as genius. The division of sovereignty meant that states had no "desire for aggrandisernent
or the care of self-defense" and could concentrate instead on "internal improvements." /d. at 169.
The happy state of affairs in America derived more from the absence of national interference with
the "spirit of enterprise" and from the "limited and incomplete nature" of the Union rather than
the presence of national power or leadership. /d. at 170.
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writing in the 1880s, analogized the "American Union" to a "great factory, wherein two sets of machinery are at work, their revolving wheels
apparently intermixed, their bands crossing one another, yet each set doing its own work without touching or hampering the other." 99 In 1871, the
Supreme Court summarized the sentiment as follows:
There are within the territorial limits of each State two
governments, restricted in their sphere of action, but independent
of each other, and supreme within their respective spheres. Each
has its separate departments; each has its distinct laws, and each
has its own tribunals of enforcement. Neither government can
intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference
therein by its judicial officers with the action of the other. 100

Print::., however, does not employ the eighteenth or nineteenth century
modes of analysis in which the Supreme Court must determine the interstate and intrastate roles which this constitutional theory would assign to
the national and state sovereignties separately.
President Reagan suggested a somewhat similar political initiative
during his administration to achieve what was called decongestion, a
"major sorting out of functional responsibilities among the three levels of
government." 101 Thus, in his 1982 State of the Union, Reagan sought a
"trade" in which the national government would assume the costs of
Medicaid and the states would accept responsibilities for food stamps and
AFDC. By disclaiming the sorting of functions as part of its etiquette of
federalism, the Printz. Court apparently would continue to leave such sorting to the political process. The Court's eighteenth century political
philosophy-based rationale, however, demands such an inquiry.
The Court's partial revival of dual sovereignty to protect the structure
of state government, but not its separate functions, seems all the more
odd because of the majority's reliance on the actual operating structures
of eighteenth century America to root its conclusion that state bureaucracies may avoid national commands to action. DeTocqueville was struck
in the nineteenth century by the apparent absence in America of government "administration" as Europeans understood it. He remarked,
"[n]othing is more striking to a European traveler in the United States
than the absence of what we term the government, or the administration.

JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH Jig (2d ed. 1891).
Tarhel's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 406 (1872). See id. at 407 ("In their laws, and
mode of enforcement, neither is responsible to the other.").
99.

100.
I() I

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IN BRIEF- THE FEDERAL

ROLF IN TilE FFDERAL SYSTEM THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH I (Dec. I nO).
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Written laws exist in America, and one sees the daily execution of them,
but although everything moves regularly, the mover can nowhere be discovered."l(12
Between 1976 and 1985, in National League of Cities and Garcia,
the Supreme Court tried to assess the intrusiveness of specific federal
laws on the operations of state government. The Tenth Amendment's
guarantee of the state's independent sovereignty required then that the
Court inquire into whether the law (I) regulated the "States as States;"
(2) addressed matters that are "indisputably attributes of state sovereignty;" and (3) required state compliance in a manner that impaired a
state's ability to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions."101 The Court, or at least Justice Blackmun who had provided the
fifth vote in National League r~f Cities, also balanced the federal interest
against the impairment of state government wherever the three-part test
was satisfied. 104 Professor Tribe has criticized the National League of
Cities approach as "Talmudic parsing of traditional and non-traditional
state functions." 105 Such parsing was, however, at the core of early America's doctrine of dual sovereignty. 106
IV.

CONCLUSION

As we have described above, while purporting to rely on historical
precedent, Printz ignores the constitutional separation of governmental
functions so obviously a part of eighteenth-century doctrine and its twentieth century analogue, National League of Cities.
Instead of parsing
interstate from intrastate responsibilities, the Printz Court distinguishes
executive and adjudicative conscription and induced cooperation from
unconstitutional coercion. The new distinctions preserve recent decisions
and dictum in cases such as FERC v. Mississippi and New York v. United
States. 107 Ironically, however, the Printz Court ignores the analytic frame-

102. DcTocquevillc, at 73. Thus, he perceived, "The adminiwativc power in the United
States presents nothing either centralized or hierarchical in its constitution; this accounts for its
passing unperceived. The power exists, but its representative is no where to be seen." !d. at 74.
Obviously, by the 1930s, this had changed. But just as obviously it would have been difficult for
DeTocqueville to have divined the extent to which national policy could be effectuated through
state bureaucracy where so little state bureaucracy could be found.
103. Ex, EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 US. 226 (1983); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1'181).
104. FERC v. Mississippi. 456 U.S. 742, 763-64 n.28 ( 1982); Hodel v. VIrginia Surface
Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 n.29; see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell. J., dissenting); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROT!INDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 4 IO(d) (5th ed. 1995).
105. LA\IRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW~ 5-22 at 396 (2d ed. 19H8)
I 06. See supra notes 98-10 I and accompanying text.
I 07. See supra notes 59. 66.
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works the Court has used in other areas important to federal-state relations, e.g. Eleventh Amendment, Erie-related doctrines, due process, and
separation of powers decisions, all of which provide criteria to delineate
the more serious intrusions on state sovereignty.
These criteria may include (I) the distinction between retroactive
sanctions and prospective injunctive relief in the Eleventh Amendment
cases, tox (2) the distinction between state procedures which appear discriminatory or neutral with respect to a federal statute's legitimate substantive objectives in the converse-Erie cases, 109 (3) the distinction between state processes that meet and do not meet federal standards of procedural fairness in the due process cases, 110 and (4) the distinction of regimes where congressional transfer of power "impermissibly threatens
the institutional integrity" of other branches of the federal government in
separation of powers cases. 111 The Court's criteria in each of these other
areas of constitutional jurisprudence seem more likely to detect situations
which offend the core policies dual sovereignty is said to protect (i.e. political accountability, preservation of liberty, cost internalization, separation of powers) than the technical boundaries, executive vs. adjudicative,
coercive vs. voluntary, upon which the Printz analysis currently turns.
Once the relevance of such policy lynchpins and analytical criteria is recognized, the Court should feel less reluctant to return to a balancing akin
to that of National League of Cities, which Justice Rehnquist once confidently declared would "in time again command the support of a majority
of [the] Court." 112

I 08. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
I 09. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
Ill. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text; see also CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
851 ( 1986) (examining "the extent to which a congressional decision to authorize the adjudication
of Article III business in a non-Article Ill tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity
of the Judicial Branch," rejecting "formalistic and unbending rules.").
112. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Tramit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J,
dissenting).

